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NOTES
THE EXPANDING RIGHT OF ACCESS: DOES IT EXTEND TO
SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS?
INTRODUCTION
The need for a check on judicial proceedings through an informed
public has been recognized as far back as the fourteenth century B.C., in
Egypt.' Anglo-American law is characterized by a long tradition of open
judicial proceedings designed to encourage free discussion and criticism
of the government and its processes.2
In the United States, the right of access to judicial proceedings has
been found under the Constitution3 and the common law.4 Lower courts
have gradually expanded the constitutional right of access beyond crimi-
nal trials to include voir dire proceedings, suppression hearings,5 due
process and entrapment hearings,6 bail hearings,7 and plea and sentenc-
ing hearing documents.' Courts have also expanded the right of access
under the common law to encompass pre-sentence probation reports,9
judicial records,10 and videotapes offered as evidence at trial."1
1. See Special Committee on Free Press and Fair Trial, American Newspaper Pub-
lishers Association, Free Press and Fair Trial at vii (1967). "Lo, whenever an administra-
tor hears cases let there be publicity... report[ing] all that he may do. Lo, then his
conduct is by no means unperceived." Id. (quoting from the tomb of Rekhmire, Vizer to
Tuthmosis III, King of Egypt, XVIII dynasty (1580-1321 B.C.)).
2. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982). See gener-
ally Note, First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases, 32
Emory L.J. 619, 628-34 (1983) (long-standing tradition of open trials in Anglo-American
law). Historically, outsiders have viewed this practice as unusual. "Nothing is more apt
to surprise a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which we enjoy in this country, of com-
municating whatever we please to the public, and of openly censuring every measure,
entered into by the king or his ministers." D. Hume, Of the Liberty of the Press, in 1
Essays Moral, Political and Literary 94 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1907), quoted in Kur-
land, The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the First
Amendment, 55 Miss. L.J. 225, 232 (1985).
3. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise II]; Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984)
[hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267 (1948).
4. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-73 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion).
5. See United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 1982).
6. See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554-55 (3d Cir. 1982).
7. See United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363-64 (5th Cir. 1983).
8. See In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986); see also United
States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985) (access to all documents submitted in
connection to any judicial proceedings); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court,
705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (access to pretrial documents in general); Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 802 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (access to certain civil proceedings).
9. See United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1584 (9th Cir.), modified, 854 F.2d
359 (1988).
10. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).
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Recently, four circuit courts have examined whether the right of ac-
cess 12 should be extended to search warrant affidavits l3 that the govern-
ment has filed under seal. 14 The Eighth Circuit found a constitutional
right of access to search warrant documents while not reaching the com-
mon-law issue;15 the Fourth Circuit a common-law right of access while
rejecting the constitutional argument; 6 the Second Circuit a common-
law right while not reaching the constitutional issue;17 and the Ninth
Circuit no right of access at all.1 8
Part I of this Note discusses the history and development of the right
of access under the Constitution and the common law, examining how
that right has been applied to various proceedings and documents. Part
II asserts that the first amendment right of access encompasses search
warrant affidavits, analyzing the arguments for and against such an ex-
11. See United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 942, 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. The standards and procedures that must be followed by the court in sealing docu-
ments depends on whether the right of access is found under the first amendment or the
common law. Under the first amendment, there are strict safeguards to prevent unconsti-
tutional infringements on the right of access. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying
text. Under the common law, the district court may seal documents with few or no
limitations. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
13. The fourth amendment guarantees people the right to "be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
amend. IV. A warrant is necessary for most searches and seizures. A search warrant,
however, is not required in a search incident to a lawful arrest, see United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); United States v. Queen, 847 F.2d 346, 352 (7th Cir.
1988); United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 562 (1988), a search conducted while in hot pursuit, see United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967), or a search pursu-
ant to a need to preserve evidence. See United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d
1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 152 (1988). See generally W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Proce-
dure § 3.4, at 126-27 (1985) (police authorized to search without warrant under certain
circumstances).
The fourth amendment further provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The facts in an affidavit submitted in support of a
search warrant application must establish probable cause, as determined by a magistrate,
subject to judicial review during a suppression hearing. See W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra,
§ 3.3, at 109. On appeal, the issue is whether the magistrate acted properly in issuing the
warrant, not whether the police acted properly in executing the search. See Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 84 (1979) (overruling holding on standing to challenge search warrant issuance, but
not affecting standards of appeal).
The police must establish two elements to support the issuance of a search warrant:
first, that the items sought are connected with criminal activity, and second, that the
items listed in the warrant will be found at the place specified in the warrant. See W.
LaFave & J. Israel, supra, § 3.3, at 110.
14. See infra notes 75-121 and accompanying text.
15. See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 572-74 (8th
Cir. 1988).
16. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1989).
17. See In re Newsday, 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990).
18. See Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 1989).
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tension. It further contends that a right of access to search warrant affi-
davits exists under the common law.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF AccEss
A. The First Amendment Right of Access
The first amendment' 9 does not explicitly grant a right of access to
judicial proceedings,20 but the Supreme Court has interpreted it as im-
plicitly guaranteeing such a right.2 The Supreme Court first alluded to
the existence of a right of access to judicial proceedings in Branzburg v.
Hayes,2 2 noting in dictum that the first amendment protected the press in
its news gathering capacity.23 In subsequent cases, the Court continued
to allude to a constitutionally granted right of access. 24
Only recently, however, has the Court explicitly recognized the consti-
tutional right of the press and the public to attend criminal trials.25 In
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,26 the Court found this right im-
plicit in the first and fourteenth amendments, stating that "a presump-
tion of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our
system of justice."' 27 Among the reasons enumerated for allowing open-
19. The Supreme Court has also examined the right of access of the press and the
public under the sixth amendment. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979),
the Court decided that the sixth amendment right to a public trial could be exercised only
by the criminal defendant and could not be invoked by the press to secure access to
criminal proceedings. See id. at 379-80.
20. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.
21. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion). Some courts refer to the qualified right of access as a presumption of access.
See In re Continental Ill. See. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984). The principles
and procedures implicated are identical, however, regardless of terminology.
22. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
23. See id. at 681. "[N]ews gathering does.., qualify for First Amendment protec-
tion; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." Id.
24. In 1974, the Court examined the press' right of access to federal and state prisons
and determined that reporters had no greater right than the public at large. See Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834
(1974).
In 1976, the Court held that information that the media acquired from an open hearing
should not be withheld from the public, limiting the trial court's authority and discretion
in imposing prior restraints upon the press. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 569 (1976). In order to justifiably impose a prior restraint, see supra note 158, a trial
court must establish that the pretrial publicity would threaten the defendant's right to a
fair trial, that other preventative measures, see supra notes 168-170 and accompanying
text, are unlikely to protect this right and that prior restraints would likely protect this
right. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562-69.
25. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 573.
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ness were preventing official misconduct, deterring vigilantism, encour-
aging testimony and discouraging perjury, increasing public confidence
in the judicial system, and promoting the appearance of fairness.2" The
Court stipulated that the right of access was not absolute, but could be
restricted by the trial judge upon a showing of "overriding interests."29
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan proposed a two-prong approach
for analyzing whether a first amendment right of access exists.3 0 First,
the proceeding must have been traditionally open to the public.31 Sec-
ond, access must further self-government.3 2 Once a court finds that a
right of access exists, that right may be restricted only by a compelling
government interest.3
3
In later cases, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the analysis set
out by Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers.34 The Court used this
two-prong approach in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 35 to inval-
idate a Massachusetts statute that required certain trials to be closed to
the public 3 6 In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court37 ("Press-Enter-
prise I"), the Supreme Court again used Justice Brennan's Richmond
Newspapers approach, this time extending the first amendment right of
28. See id. at 569-73; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
606 (1982) (openness promotes quality and integrity of judicial proceedings and increases
public respect for judicial process); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 722
(1931) (first amendment important to system of representative self-government).
29. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980). This
phrase was not defined in the decision.
30. See id. at 588-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31. See id. at 589. A requirement of historical openness, referred to as the historical
or experience test, is an aspect of both the first amendment right of access and the com-
mon-law right of access. The tradition of openness, however, has been subject to different
interpretations. Compare Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1986) (historical open-
ness based on tradition of state court) with Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 506-08
(1984) (determining openness by examining evolution of proceeding under English law).
In his concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan stated that "[t]radition,
contemporaneous state practice, and th[e] Court's own decisions" all determine whether
a proceeding is traditionally open to the public. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 593.
32. See id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). Courts refer to this second step as either
the functional, structural or logic test.
Under a "republican system of self-government," id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring),
it is necessary to have an informed citizenry capable of conducting meaningful debate on
public issues. The first amendment guarantees access to information necessary to have
meaningful, informed discussion on public issues, enabling the citizenry to make intelli-
gent decisions concerning their system of government. See id. at 587-589.
33. See id. at 598. Justice Brennan declined to elaborate on "[w]hat countervailing
interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse th[e] presumption of openness," but
stated national security concerns as a possible example. See id. at 598 n.24.
34. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-06 (1982); Press-
Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
35. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
36. See id. at 598, 610-11. The statute in question required that whenever a minor
was the alleged victim of a sexual offense, the trial would have to be closed. See id. at 598
n. 1.
37. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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access to encompass proceedings other than criminal trials.3" The Court
determined that there is a right of access to voir dire proceedings,3 9 stat-
ing that historically these proceedings had been open as part of the trial
process.' The Court then considered the benefits of open proceedings
and determined that a public right of access to voir dire proceedings
served the interests of self-government.41
In a later case, also entitled Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court42
("Press-Enterprise 11"), the Court held that a qualified right of access
under the first amendment could extend to other preliminary criminal
hearings.43 The Court focused on whether the proceedings were tradi-
tionally accessible in federal and state courts, rather than concentrating
on the English common-law tradition, as was done in Press-Enterprise I,
and determined that preliminary hearings satisfied the historical aspect
of the two-prong test.' The Court next considered the functional aspect
of the proceeding and asserted that preliminary hearings may be the most
important part of a criminal proceeding, and thus openness would be
beneficial for the same reasons supporting open criminal trials.45
In addition to trials and certain preliminary criminal hearings, several
38. See id. at 511. Previously, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979),
the Court had stated that even if a sixth amendment right of access to trials did exist, see
supra note 19, it would not necessarily apply to pretrial proceedings. See Gannett, 443
U.S. at 387. The Court also found no persuasive evidence of a common-law tradition of
public access to such proceedings. See id.
Before Press-Enterprise I, however, several lower courts already had determined that
the constitutional right of access did extend to various pretrial proceedings. In United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167-71 (9th Cir. 1982), the court granted the press
and public access to voir dire proceedings and suppression hearings. In so doing, the
court relied primarily on the functional prong of Justice Brennan's test rather than the
historical test. Additionally, the court devised a two-step process that a judge must fol-
low before sealing or closing a proceeding. First, the court must give any person ex-
cluded a reasonable opportunity to state any objections. Second, the trial court must
explain its reasons for ordering the closure. See id. at 1167-68. Only when these criteria
are satisfied can the court close a particular proceeding.
Other pretrial proceedings have also been recognized as being within the scope of the
first amendment right of access. Courts have recognized a first amendment right of ac-
cess to suppression hearings, see United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir.
1982); United States v. Dorfman, 550 F. Supp. 877, 880 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 690 F.2d 1217
(1982); United States v. Pageau, 526 F. Supp. 1221, 1223 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), due process
and entrapment hearings, see Criden, 675 F.2d at 557, hearings setting or reducing bail,
see United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983), and pretrial proceedings
in civil trials that involve "the release or incarceration of prisoners and the conditions of
their confinement." Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983).
39. See Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 505-10.
40. See id. at 505-08.
41. See id. at 508-10. That same year, the Court extended the defendant's sixth
amendment right to a public trial to include a right to a public pretrial suppression hear-
ing, noting that such hearings were often as important as the trial itself. See Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
42. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
43. See id. at 10-13.
44. See id. at 10-11.
45. See id. at 11-12. "[P]ublic access to criminal trials... is essential to the proper
1990]
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courts have determined that the right of access applies to judicial docu-
ments, particularly, but not exclusively those related to open proceed-
ings.46 In 1983, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[t]here is no reason to
distinguish between pretrial proceedings and the documents filed in re-
gard to them" because they serve the same interests and goals.47 Conse-
quently, the court held that the first amendment right of access extended
to pretrial documents in general,4" noting that they "are often important
to a full understanding of the way in which the 'judicial process and the
government as a whole' are functioning."49
While the constitutional right of access has been applied to certain
documents by certain courts, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
functioning of the criminal justice system. California preliminary hearings are sufficiently
like a trial to justify the same conclusion." Id. at 12.
The Court specified that the holding applied only to preliminary hearings as conducted
in California.
In California, to bring a felon to trial, the prosecutor has a choice of securing
a grand jury indictment or a finding of probable cause following a preliminary
hearing. Even when the accused has been indicted by a grand jury, however, he
has an absolute right to an elaborate preliminary hearing before a neutral mag-
istrate. The accused has the right to personally appear at the hearing, to be
represented by counsel, to cross-examine hostile witnesses, to present exculpa-
tory evidence, and to exclude illegally obtained evidence. If the magistrate de-
termines that probable cause exists, the accused is bound over for trial; such a
finding leads to a guilty plea in the majority of cases.
Id. (citation omitted).
46. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th
Cir. 1988) (documents filed in connection with pretrial detention proceedings); United
States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1988) (plea hearings and plea agreements); In re
New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (documents filed in connection
with suppression motions), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1272 (1988); In re Washington Post
Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (affidavits submitted in connection with plea and
sentencing hearings); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1985) (bills
of particular); CBS v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (first
amendment provides public with a right of access to criminal proceedings and documents
filed therein); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1983) (pretrial documents generally accessible).
47. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
48. See id. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986), stated that the public has a first
amendment right of access to transcripts of preliminary hearings in criminal prosecu-
tions. See id. at 13. The media has also been granted a first amendment "right of access
to information concerning crime in the community, and to information relating to activi-
ties of law enforcement agencies," including arrest sheets, police blotters and the first
pages of the offense reports. See Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston,
531 S.W.2d 177, 186-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). The first amendment right of access has
been extended to include plea and sentencing hearings as well as any documents con-
nected to these proceedings. See In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389-90 (4th
Cir. 1986). In 1976, the Ohio Supreme Court held that city jail logs, which listed the
arrest numbers, names of prisoners, dates, times and dispositions of charges and the
charges themselves, were public records and could be disclosed to a newspaper. See Day-
ton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 109-10, 341 N.E.2d 576, 578
(1976).
49. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)).
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the documents issue. As a result, the public availability of particular
documents, such as search warrant affidavits, is in dispute.
B. The Common-Law Right of Access
Open trials are a long-standing tradition in Anglo-American common
law." Before the Norman Conquest, England had a court system with
mandatory attendance by freemen. 1 This early form of the jury system
was the basis of the Anglo-American tradition of open trials which has
continued since. 2 "ITihere is little record, if any, of secret proceedings
... in known English history."53 The colonists in America incorporated
this openness into many colonial charters and state constitutions. 4
Judicial records also have a long tradition of openness. In fourteenth-
century England, a right of access to judicial records was established that
mandated public access regardless of proprietary interest in or intended
use of the documents.5 Under the English common law, the courts dis-
tinguished judicial records that had been publicly introduced into evi-
dence from those which had not and granted public access more readily
to the former.5
6
The United States Supreme Court, in an early copyright case,5 7 implic-
itly recognized an inherent common-law right of access to court records
under the American common law, ruling that no court reporter could
obtain a copyright in judicial opinions.5 In a later case, the Supreme
50. See F. Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law 31-32 (1974); see, e.g., Sloan
Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co., 117 F. 504, 506 (D. Colo. 1902) ("[S]trangers to the
suit... ought to be at liberty to inquire how the controversy is carried on."); United
States v. Burka, 289 A.2d 376, 379 (D.C. 1972) ("[I]f a judge's comment should not be
recorded and reported it should not have been said in the first place."); Ex parte
Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404, 407-08 (1894) (patent registration litigation cannot be
conducted in secrecy).
There are two reasons why there is little case law dealing explicitly with pretrial access
under the common law. First, many pretrial procedures are of relatively recent origin.
See Note, supra note 2, at 629. Second, those pretrial procedures having a long history
have attained significance only in the past few centuries. Id. at 633-34.
51. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
52. See id. at 565-69.
53. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 420 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
54. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 590-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. See Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In
Camera or On Camera, 16 Georgia L. Rev. 659, 661 (1982). Originally, the King's adver-
saries were denied access to any documents which could be harmful to him. In 1372,
Parliament passed an ordinance opening court records to all, including those with inter-
ests adverse to the King. See id. (citing 46 Edw. 3 (1372); 2 Eng. Statutes at Large 191,
196-97 (1341-1411)). The courts, however, did not interpret this statute broadly, constru-
ing it to grant access only where the person seeking access had a proprietary or eviden-
tiary interest in the document. See id. at 662-63 & n.20 (citing King v. Shelley, 100 Eng.
Rep. 498 (K.B. 1789); Folkard v. Hemet, 96 Eng. Rep. 624 (C.P. 1776); Rex v. Midlam,
97 Eng. Rep. 1064 (K.B. 1765); Roe v. Aylmar, 94 Eng. Rep. 893 (C.P. 1732-1756)).
56. See Note, supra note 55, at 665-66.
57. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
58. See id. at 624. Several lower courts had also extended the common-law right of
1990]
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Court reasoned that judicial opinions are legal interpretations binding on
all citizens and therefore must be open. 9
Courts have noted that these same inherent values and policies man-
date a common-law right of.access to court records. 6° These policies
include maintaining "the confidence of the community in the honesty of
its institutions, in the competence of its public officers, in the impartiality
of its judges, and in the capacity of its criminal law to do justice. 61
The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed a common-law right of
access to judicial records. In a case involving access to the Watergate
tapes, 62 the Supreme Court again63 recognized a general common-law
right of public access regardless of proprietary or evidentiary interests in
the records.' 4
Lower courts have continued to recognize the common-law right of
access to judicial records. In 1980, the Second Circuit recognized a
strong presumption in favor of a common-law right of access to any
items entered into the judicial records;65 only the most compelling cir-
access to judicial documents to all citizens because such access served as a check on
government officials and others in the public service. See, e.g., O'Hara v. King, 52 Ill.
303, 305 (1869) ("motives of curiosity merely" are sufficient grounds for granting com-
mon-law access to documents); State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 627, 57 N.E.
535, 538 (1900) (citizens have right to copy and inspect all county records and papers);
State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336-39 (1879) (person entitled to inspect
public documents even where no suit is pending or forthcoming).
59. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888); see also Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ("American decisions generally do not
condition enforcement of th[e right of access] on a proprietary interest in the document
.... "); Banks & Bros. v. West Publishing Co., 27 F. 50, 57 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886) (com-
mon-law right of public access should be liberally interpreted and enforced because court
records are binding legal authority upon all citizens); Nowack v. Auditor Gen., 243
Mich. 200, 203, 219 N.W. 749, 750 (1928) (any rule denying common-law right of access
to public records is "repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions"); State ex rel.
Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682, 137 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Wis. 1965) (per curiam)
(public officer must specifically justify refusal of request to inspect public records).
60. See United States v. Burka, 289 A.2d 376, 377-79 (D.C. 1972).
61. Id. at 379 (quoting Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 91
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).
62. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
63. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
64. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597; see also In re Mosher, 248 F.2d 956, 958-59 (C.C.P.A.
1957) (person does not need special interest in judicial proceeding to have right of access
to related judicial records); In re Sackett, 136 F.2d 248, 249 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (patent
application must be accessible).
The Nixon Court, while finding a presumption strongly favoring public access, denied
access on the basis of a congressional act that limited public access to private presidential
documents. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603-08.
The lower court in this case stressed the public's historical privilege of access to judicial
documents, noting that this right was "fundamental to a democratic state.... [and]
serves to produce 'an informed and enlightened public opinion.'" United States v.
Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 247 (1936)), rev'd on other grounds, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
65. See United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 58
RIGHT OF ACCESS
cumstances would suffice to limit such access.66 The Third Circuit noted
that the Supreme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers strongly sup-
ported the common-law basis for a right of access to trial materials and
trials. 7 Such a right would allow "broader dissemination [which] would
serve the same values of 'community catharsis,' observation of the crimi-
nal trial process, and public awareness served by the open trial guaran-
tee."68 In United States v. Schlette,6 9 the Ninth Circuit extended the
common-law right of access to encompass pre-sentence probation re-
ports.70 The Seventh Circuit also extended the common-law right of ac-
cess to judicial records, while emphasizing the court's discretion in
allowing or denying the release of such documents.71 It noted that courts
should consider the likelihood that the records, if released, would be used
for "improper purposes. "72
Courts have recognized that the common-law right of access to docu-
ments connected to a judicial proceeding exists apart from any right of
access to the actual proceeding.73 However, access to such documents is
not unlimited,74 and controversy exists as to whether specific types of
documents fall within the common-law right of access.
C. The Current Controversy
The Eighth Circuit, in In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-
Gunn,75 considered whether the first amendment right of access to court
proceedings included a right of access to documents submitted in support
of an application for a search warrant. The court applied the established
two-prong test and determined that such a constitutional right, albeit
qualified, did exist,7 '6 but did not address whether a common-law right of
access to search warrant affidavits also existed.
Search warrant affidavits satisfied the historical requirement of the test
because they are commonly filed with the clerk of the court without be-
66. See id.
67. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 820-22 (3d Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 822.
69. 842 F.2d 1574 (9th Cir.), modified, 854 F.2d 359 (1988).
70. See id. at 1583.
71. See United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982).
72. See id. at 1293, (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
598 (1978)). But see supra note 59 and accompanying text (granting right of access re-
gardless of use).
73. See, eg., United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Dorfman, 690
F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1982).
74. Courts have denied access to records under the common law for a variety of rea-
sons. See, eg., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1979) (access denied to
protect valid trade secret information); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 568,
40 N.W. 731, 734-35 (1888) (access denied to ensure files would not be source of libelous
statements used by press).
75. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
76. See id. at 572-74.
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ing placed under seal." Judicial records and documents filed in support
of search warrants therefore historically have been open to public
inspection.78
Next, the court determined that public access to these documents
would serve a positive role in the public's perception of the criminal jus-
tice system.79 Such access would enable the public to better understand
the function and operation of the criminal justice system, of which search
warrants are an integral part, and would broaden the public's compre-
hension of the judicial process.8 0 Public access would also keep
prosecutorial and judicial behavior in check.81
Search warrants are often the center of pretrial suppression hearings,
which are open to the public under the first amendment.8 2 This first
amendment right of access has been found to include access not only to
pretrial proceedings, but also to the documents related to those proceed-
ings. 3 In consideration of these factors, a first amendment right of ac-
cess to search warrant affidavits exists.8 4 This first amendment right of
access is qualified by a constitutional strict scrutiny inquiry. 5 The party
seeking to restrict access must prove a compelling government interest, 6
indicating that closing the proceedings or sealing the documents is "es-
sential to preserve higher values."8s7 Furthermore, any closure or sealing
procedure must be strictly tailored to protect that interest.8 8
In the instant case, disclosing the information in the search warrant
affidavits would have severely compromised the ongoing investigation,
thereby amounting to a compelling government interest. Further, sealing
the documents was not an overly broad measure for protecting this inter-
est.89 Therefore, access to the search warrant affidavits was denied. 90
In Times Mirror Co. v. United States,91 the Ninth Circuit held that at






83. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
84. See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 575 (8th Cir.
1988).
85. See id. at 574.
86. See id. The phrase, compelling government interest, is taken from Press-Enter-
prise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982))). The actual
definition of compelling government interest is not discussed in any of these cases.
87. United States v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1272 (1988) (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (quoting Press-Enterprise
I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984))).
88. See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir.
1988).
89. See id. at 574-75.
90. See id.
91. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989).
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least while the pre-indictment investigation is ongoing, no right of access
exists for search warrant affidavits under either the first amendment or
the common law,92 stating that "complete openness [of judicial proceed-
ings and documents] would undermine important values that are served
by keeping some proceedings closed to the public."9 3 Additionally, no
tradition of open warrant proceedings existed to support access; rather,
warrant proceedings were traditionally carried out in secret.9 4
In determining "whether public access would play a 'significant posi-
tive role in the functioning' of the proceeding[s], ' '9 5 the Ninth Circuit
weighed the various interests that would be served by free access to
search warrant affidavits against the damage to the ongoing criminal in-
vestigations that could result from such access. 96 It also considered the
privacy interests of the individuals identified in the warrants and sup-
porting affidavits 97 and decided that the social utility of open warrant
proceedings and documents was outweighed by the substantial burden
such a practice would impose on the criminal investigative process.98
Times Mirror also determined that no right of access to search warrant
affidavits existed under the common law. 99 It stated that the threshold
test for recognition of such a common-law right was a showing that dis-
closure would serve the ends of justice."° Because this requirement was
not satisfied and a history of access was absent, the court held that a
common-law right of access did not exist. 1 ' Thus, despite the position
of the Eighth Circuit," 2 no public right of access to search warrant affi-
davits existed.103
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz," 4 the Fourth Circuit, employing the
standard two-prong test, declared that search warrant affidavits lacked a
tradition of openness and thus were not encompassed by the first amend-
ment right of access."5 However, the court found that the common-law
right of access to judicial records"0 6 did encompass search warrant affida-
92. See id. at 1212-19.
93. Id. at 1213.
94. See id. at 1213-14. But see In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855
F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (search warrant affidavits fulfill historical requirement).
Disagreement may result from different interpretations of the historical requirement. See
supra note 31.
95. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1989) (quot-
ing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986)).
96. See id. at 1215.
97. See id. at 1216.
98. See id. at 1215.
99. See id. at 1219.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1217.
103. See id. at 1221.
104. 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
105. See id. at 64.
106. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
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vits. 10 7 The court noted that Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure' requires that all papers supporting a warrant, along with
the warrant, be filed with the clerk of the district court."° Therefore,
search warrant affidavits should be classified as judicial records and thus
fall under the common-law right of access." 0
Under the common-law right, a judicial officer may seal and deny ac-
cess to documents when such measures are "essential to preserve higher
values and [are] narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'' The Balti-
more Sun court delineated the procedure that a judicial officer must fol-
low in sealing such documents in order to preserve the public's common-
law right to the greatest extent possible.11 2
Most recently, in In re Newsday," 3 the Second Circuit addressed the
issue of access to search warrant affidavits. The court found that a right
of access existed under the common law," 4 but declined to decide the
issue of a constitutional right of access to these documents.' 5 Like the
Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun, the Second Circuit based its recognition
of the common-law right of access on the filing procedures required by
Rule 41(g)" 6 for search warrant applications and supporting materials.
The court reasoned that such filing gives these applications "status as a
public document subject to a common law right of access."' 1 7
It noted that the common-law right of access is a qualified one,' 18 and
that it is within the power of a district court to "redact a document to the
point of rendering it meaningless, or not to release it at all."' ' The court
further found that the district court must weigh the right of access
107. See Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65 ("[Tlhe common law qualified right of access
to [search] warrant papers is committed to the sound discretion of the judicial officer who
issued the warrant.").
108. Rule 41(g) provides: "The federal magistrate before whom the warrant is re-
turned shall attach to the warrant a copy of the return, inventory and all other papers in
connection therewith and shall file them with the clerk of the district court for the district
in which the property was seized." Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).
109. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989).
110. See id.
111. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); see also New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (only proof that
publication will result in "untoward consequences" will justify denying access). It should
be noted that there is some "cross-pollination" between the constitutional and common-
law rights of access in the standards applied and terminology employed.
112. See Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65-66. The court prescribed the following proce-
dures: There must be notice by the court so as to alert any interested parties to the
impending sealing of the documents, anybody desiring access must have the chance to
voice his objections to the sealing, alternatives to sealing the documents must be consid-
ered and the court must articulate its reasons for sealing the documents. See id.
113. 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990).
114. See id. at 78.
115. See id. at 75.
116. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).
117. In re Newsday, 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990).
118. See id.
119. Id. at 80.
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against privacy interests,1 20 but that "drastic restrictions on the common-
law right of access are not always appropriate.' 121
II. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVITS
A. The Constitutional Right of Access
Since the Supreme Court first recognized a first amendment right of
access in Richmond Newspapers,'2 2 courts have gradually expanded this
right. A constitutional right of access has been found for various non-
trial judicial proceedings 123 as well as documents related to judicial pro-
ceedings. 124 Search warrant affidavits can satisfy both the historical 125
and functional1 26 portions of the two-prong test. Thus, the right of ac-
cess should include search warrant affidavits.
The two-prong "experience and logic" approach should be revised,
however, to eliminate or at least minimize the importance of the histori-
cal consideration. Many pretrial proceedings either developed recently
or traditionally have been closed, and therefore do not meet the historical
component, but the lack of a strong tradition of access should not fore-
close the existence of a first amendment right of access in the pretrial
context.' 27 "[H]istory alone cannot provide a logical basis for limiting
the access right to trials, given the First Amendment's structural
role." ' 28 A strict application of the historical approach in the pretrial
context would be unfair as it would automatically foreclose access.
Since the two-prong approach was established, courts have increas-
ingly emphasized the structural aspect of the test;'29 the historical treat-
120. See id. at 79-80.
121. Id. at 80.
122. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
123. See, ag., In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986) (first amend-
ment right of access to documents concerning plea and sentencing hearings); Associated
Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983) (public and press have
first amendment right of access to pretrial documents). Advocates of liberal access insist
that "all information relevant to an arrest should be publicly available." Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Privacy and Security of Criminal History Informa-
tion 33 (1979).
124. See United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 1985) (right of access to
voir dire examination of potential jurors in criminal trials); In re Continental Ill. See.
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (policy reasons behind right of access to crimi-
nal proceedings apply equally to civil proceedings).
125. Although the courts that have addressed this issue have disagreed about whether
the historical prong of the test is met, see supra notes 75-117 and accompanying text,
arguably, sufficient authority supports a finding of a tradition of access. See infra notes
77-78 and accompanying text.
126. There are sufficient benefits that would result from a constitutional right of access
to satisfy the structural aspect of the analysis. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text; infra 143-163 and accompanying text.
127. See Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Iowa
1983); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Kammeyer, 341 N.W.2d 550, 555-56 (Minn.
1983); Note, supra note 2, at 626.
128. Note, supra note 2, at 626.
129. See Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ment of the proceeding currently is a secondary factor in many courts. 30
The Supreme Court, while adopting the two-prong approach, appears to
emphasize the functional analysis over the historical analysis."' Elimi-
nating or minimizing the significance of the historical consideration
would naturally increase the likelihood that a constitutional right of ac-
cess would be found, because many types of judicial proceedings would
meet the standard of "promoting self-government." '32
Not all courts, however, maintain that the historical aspect is relatively
unimportant. Citing Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 33 justified the use of a historical re-
quirement by noting that "the Constitution carries the gloss of his-
tory," '134 and that "a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable
judgment of experience." 35 The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed its
approval of the traditional test when it held that there is no right of ac-
cess to pre-sentencing reports.1 36 Furthermore, although the Supreme
Court has apparently shifted its emphasis to the structural aspect, subse-
quent decisions make clear that it has not renounced the two-prong
Here, the Ninth Circuit found a qualified first amendment right of access to pretrial pro-
ceedings, despite the absence of a tradition of public access. The criminal defendant was
accused of lacing Excedrin capsules with cyanide and was indicted for product tamper-
ing. The Seattle Times sought access to the pretrial detention hearings and its related
documents. See id. at 1514.
The court decided that the lack of historical access to these proceedings should not
automatically bar a right of access. See id. at 1516. The court stressed the growing
importance of pretrial detention hearings in the modem judicial system and decided that
the proceedings would not be closed unless it was shown that less intrusive alternatives
would not adequately protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. See id. at 1518.
130. See Note, The Supreme Court's Development of the First Amendment Right of
Access to Criminal Proceedings and the Ninth Circuit's Expansion of that Right, 25 Wil-
lamette L. Rev. 379, 400 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Right ofAccess]. Such an approach is
especially appropriate in considering access to pretrial procedures and the related docu-
ments, as many of these procedures lack a long tradition of either access or closure. See
Note, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett and Richmond Newspa-
pers Public Right of Access Cases, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 603, 626 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Confusion in the Courthouse].
131. See Note, Right of Access, supra note 130, at 401; see also Note, Confusion in the
Courthouse, supra note 130, at 626 (Court has "recently emphasized the importance of
functional considerations rather than historical precedence and endorsed an approach
that makes it easy to characterize access to any type of pretrial proceeding as promoting
first amendment interests.").
132. See Note, supra note 130, at 401; Note, Confusion in the Courthouse, supra note
130, at 626.
133. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
134. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
135. Id.; cf. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Historical experience... counsels in favor of finding a First Amendment right of access
to the criminal trial.").
136. See United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1989). The court based
its decision on the usual two-prong "experience and logic" test, stating that there was no
history of access to such documents, and that public disclosure of the contents of these




Even under the historical analysis, however, it is still possible to bring
warrant affidavits within the first amendment scope. Although search
warrant proceedings have historically been closed, the constitutional right
of access to documents involved in a hearing must be determined apart
from the press' right of access to the actual hearing. 138 "[T]he press and
the public have historically had a common law right of access to most
pretrial documents."1 39 As discussed in In re Search Warrant-Gunn," a
right of access to search warrant applications and the affidavits filed in
support of them has traditionally existed. 4 1 Therefore, search warrant
affidavits have a sufficient tradition of openness to satisfy the "experi-
ence" standard of Justice Brennan's two-prong test.
Search warrant affidavits also satisfy the structural prong of Justice
Brennan's analysis, providing substantial benefits including the further-
ance of self-government. It has been recommended that "[u]nless other-
wise provided by law, all preliminary criminal proceedings, including
preliminary examinations and hearings on pretrial motions sh[ould] be
held in open court and sh[ould] be available for attendance and observa-
tion by the public" unless closure is justified to protect the defendant's
right to a fair trial.142
Many of the benefits derived from public trials also apply to pretrial
proceedings143 and to judicial documents such as search warrant affida-
vits. 11 The first amendment safeguards the public's right to be informed
of interesting or noteworthy events.1 4 1 Such knowledge is necessary for
137. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
139. Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983).
140. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
141. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
142. Judicial Conference of the United States, 1980 Amendments to Fair Trial-Free
Press Guidelines Sect. C(4), reprinted in Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave and J. Israel, Modem
Criminal Procedure, Basic Criminal Procedure, app. A & C (5th ed. 1982 & supp. 1985).
143. See Note, supra note 2, at 626; see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 516
(Stevens, J., concurring) (1984) ("[T]he distinction between trials and other official pro-
ceedings is not necessarily dispositive, or even important, in evaluating the First Amend-
ment issues."). Courts have held that pretrial suppression hearings and other kinds of
non-trial proceedings in criminal and civil cases are subject to the first amendment right
of access. See, e.g., In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1987)
(right of access extends to certain pretrial proceedings), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988);
In re Application of Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1984) (first amendment extends
some degree of public access to a pre-trial suppression hearing); United States v. Brook-
lier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 1982) (right of access extends to hearings on mo-
tions to suppress evidence); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 1982)
(societal interests mandating right of access to criminal trials also apply equally to pre-
trial procedures).
144. See Note, Access Deferred Is Access Denied, 15 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 739, 751-52
(1989).
145. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976).
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the open discussions and debates that are essential to self-government. 146
The first amendment's free speech and free press clauses are designed to
promote public discourse by making available information that is neces-
sary for intelligent and meaningful debate, which in turn helps to main-
tain an effective system of self-government.147
These goals are also implicated in pretrial suppression hearings, which
are designed to ensure that any illegally obtained evidence is not
presented to the jury.14  At the heart of many suppression hearings are
search warrant affidavits submitted in support of the issuance of a war-
rant. Public access to pretrial suppression hearings allows informed pub-
lic debate on investigatory techniques and search warrant proceedings
and serves to educate the public on the proper procedures for conducting
searches. 14 9 To reap the benefits of open suppression hearings, the docu-
ments invol, ed must also be accessible.150
In Globe Newspapers, the Court granted access to criminal trials be-
cause it believed that access ensured active participation by the individ-
ual citizen in the self-government of the United States.' Access also
served as a check upon possible abuse of judicial power while enhancing
"the integrity of the factfinding process."' 52 In an earlier case,15 3 the
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he law ... favors publicity in legal pro-
ceedings, so far as that object can be attained without injustice to the
persons immediately concerned." ' Similarly, access to search warrant
affidavits serves to promote self-government.1 5
Access acts as a deterrent to misconduct. There must be some process
by which society can monitor law enforcement officials' decisions to
search and seize persons and property rather than relying solely on the
judgment of the neutral magistrate. 56 There is also a need for public
review of judicial performance.' 57 Only by allowing access to all records
prior to a final decision can the public adequately assess the judge's
decisions.' 5
146. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
147. See Note, First Amendment Right of Access, supra note 2, at 634.
148. See id. at 648.
149. See id.
150. See Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983).
151. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
152. Id. at 606.
153. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
154. Id. at 542 (quoting 2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 931-32 (Carrington ed.
1927)).
155. See infra notes 143-164 and accompanying text.
156. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978) ("the hearing before the magis-
trate not always will suffice to discourage lawless or reckless misconduct").
157. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
158. See id. at 1181 (public has interest in records court relied on in reaching decision);
see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (access serves
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A right of access to search warrant affidavits would also promote good
will and public confidence in the judicial process. 159 Suppression hear-
ings may be the only judicial proceeding in a particular case. If the evi-
dence is allowed, the defendant may choose to plea bargain and not
pursue a trial. If the evidence is disallowed, however, the prosecution
may decide to drop the charges against the defendant.1"° If such a signif-
icant procedure is conducted out of the public's view, confidence in the
judicial process may be eroded."' Allowing access to the affidavits
would reassure the public of the propriety of the suppression proceedings
and the original issuance of the search warrant, which of necessity can-
not be open to the public. Further, the "community therapeutic
value" '62 of seeing justice served in criminal trials also arises from the
proper execution of criminal investigations. 163
The right of access would also promote testimonial integrity. 164 If affi-
davits are made public, the people swearing them out would be more
conscientious about being absolutely truthful, knowing that the public
can scrutinize the affidavits.
Against these strong policy justifications, a formal argument that
search warrant proceedings are "prior to the indictment of the accused
as a check upon possible abuse of judicial power as well as enhancing "the quality and
safeguard[ing] the integrity of the factfinding process"); In re Petroleum Prod. Antitrust
Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 43 (1984) ("rationale behind access is to allow the public an oppor-
tunity to assess the correctness of the judge's decision").
Denying access to records might be an unconstitutional prior restraint. Commentators
have asserted that closed criminal proceedings are unconstitutional prior restraint on first
amendment rights. See Fenner and Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court
Criminal Proceedings, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 442, 460-75 (1978). The first amendment prohib-
its imposing prior restraints on publication except when it poses a clear and present dan-
ger to the country. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). Any order of prior
restraint of expression bears a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. See South-
eastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (per curiam); Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 181 (1968); see also Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (chief purpose of first amendment is
to prevent previous restraints). Thus, the government carries the burden of justifying the
imposition of such a restraint. See Near, 283 U.S. at 718-19; Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). It is "a theory deeply etched in our law [that]
a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand." Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S.
at 559. Even when publication may subsequently result in punishment, prior restraint is
rarely granted, so strong is the presumption against such infringement of first amendment
rights. See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. If such an analysis is correct, the
presumption against prior restraint should also apply to search warrant affidavits, al-
lowing access unless the government can meet the heavy burden of justifying closure.
159. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (access to
public trials promotes good will and public confidence in the justice system).
160. See Note, supra note 2, at 648.
161. See id. at 648-49.
162. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
163. See Note, supra note 2, at 652.
164. See id.
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and arguably are not a part of the criminal trial itself" '165 carries no
weight at all.
There is, of course, a real danger that open pretrial proceedings and
documents may jeopardize an individual's sixth amendment right to a
fair trial because potential jurors may be exposed to prejudicial pretrial
publicity.166 Nonetheless, an individual's right to a fair trial can be safe-
guarded by measures that are less intrusive on first amendment rights
than a complete denial of access. 167 In appropriate cases, change of
venue, change of venire, continuance, severance and voir dire are effec-
tive to avoid the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity. 168 Perhaps most
significantly, redaction 169 and selective sealing 170 of search warrant affi-
davits can be used to protect a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
rights. Therefore, it is possible to allow access to the documents while
protecting a potential defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial.
Publicizing a search warrant affidavit may infringe privacy interests of
the defendant, the defendant's family and the crime victim.' 7 ' The pub-
lic may assume prematurely that certain individuals are guilty of crimi-
nal conduct, 172 thus unjustly damaging the reputation of victims,
witnesses or other third persons who may never have a chance to estab-
lish their innocence. 173 Furthermore, disclosure may endanger innocent
third persons by revealing their identities. Disclosure may also make
witnesses less likely to cooperate, further hampering the government's
165. See id. at 659. Although the issuance of a search warrant may not be considered
part of the actual criminal trial, courts have not limited the application of the right of
access to trials. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
166. See Note, supra note 144, at 754-56. See generally, Note, Public's First Amend-
ment Right of Access to Pretrial Bail Hearings Limited by Defendant's Sixth Amendment
Fair Trial Guarantee, 19 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 129, 131 (1985) (discussing tension between
first amendment and sixth amendment guarantee to fair trial). It has been suggested that
"'[t]he public interest is paramount in any consideration of these two constitutional guar-
antees-a free press under the First Amendment and a fair trial under the Sixth Amend-
ment.'" Special Committee on Free Press & Fair Trial, supra note 1, at ix.
167. See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir.
1988) (court must explain why less restrictive alternatives were not appropriate if docu-
ments are sealed).
168. See Special Committee on Free Press & Fair Trial, supra note 1, at 38-39.
169. See, e.g., In re Newsday, 895 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (redacting portions of
search warrant affidavits sufficient to protect defendant's privacy interests). Through re-
daction, it is possible to preserve the individual's right to a fair trial by blocking out the
portions of the affidavits without completely denying access. See id. This process might
avoid a misinterpretation by the juror that may result in prejudice. See id. at 79.
170. See In re Sealed Affidavit(s) to Search Warrants, 600 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.
1979). District courts have an inherent power to seal search warrant affidavits although
this right can only be exercised within the limits of the Constitution. See infra note 180.
171. See United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 230-32 (7th Cir. 1989).
172. See United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1113-14 (3d Cir. 1985). These third
parties will not have the opportunity to prove their innocence in court because they are
not suspects, and therefore will not be indicted. See id.
173. See id.
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investigation.174 It is possible, however, to protect the privacy interests
of innocent third parties with less restrictive measures; 175 for example,
the names of the third parties could sometimesimply be redacted without
significantly impairing the public's ability to assess the proceedings.
176
Thus, these privacy interests need not bar the extension of the right of
access to search warrant affidavits.
The need for secrecy in issuing search warrants, grand jury proceed-
ings and government investigations in order to protect informants, inves-
tigations, and other sensitive material is another factor which could
weigh against access to affidavits.1 77 Clearly the criminal justice system
would not be more effective if these proceedings were made public.
178
The issue is not access to the proceedings, however, but to the documents
connected to them that are filed after a search warrant is issued. While
access to the proceeding would include the related documents, the ab-
sence of a right of access to a proceeding does not preclude a right of
access to the related documents.179 Affidavits may describe ongoing in-
vestigations, divulge investigative techniques, and reveal the identities of
informers whose lives might be endangered.'8 0 Procedures such as re-
dacting and selectively sealing confidential documents,' however, are
available to protect the needs of the government when there is an ongo-
ing investigation that requires confidentiality.' 82
174. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Dep't of Justice, Privacy and Secur-
ity of Criminal History Information: Privacy and the Media 31-32 (1979).
175. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
176. See In re Newsday, 895 F.2d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1990).
177. See Note, supra note 144, at 756; see also Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873
F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1989) (warrant proceedings and grand jury proceedings are
"the type of 'government operationf that would be totally frustrated if conducted
openly' ").
178. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
179. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
180. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989).
181. There is a two-fold standard for sealing documents that are constitutionally pro-
tected. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, a case-by-case evaluation is necessary before any documents or proce-
dures are closed to the press and public. Mandatory closure statutes, such as the one in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), unduly infringe on the
constitutional right of access. Before a proceeding or document is removed from public
access, a hearing that allows those who are denied access to object to the closure must be
held. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1984); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz,
886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989). Notice is also required so that those members of the
press and public who would be interested in obtaining access, but who are not present
when the closure motion is made, are aware of the impending infringement of their rights.
See Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65. The district judge must articulate the reasons for
closing or sealing the proceeding or documents so that they may be reviewed by the
appellate court. If necessary, the findings themselves may be placed under seal to protect
the interests that necessitated the underlying closure. See In re Search Warrant for Secre-
tarial Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1988).
182. See Wagner v. Williford, 804 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1986); Burke v. New York
City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 220, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Wilkinson v. F.B.I., 633 F.




*B. The Common-Law Right of Access
The Supreme Court has recognized that the public has a right,
founded in the common law, "to inspect and copy public records and
documents, including judicial records and documents."1 3 This right of
access should encompass search warrant affidavits.184
Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recognizes this
common-law right."8 5 "[I]mplicit in the rule is the direction that they be
filed within a reasonable time after the warrant is executed," '186 thus pro-
viding the public and the press with timely access to the documents.
Opponents of access to various documents often point out that some
judicial documents, for example documents relating to grand jury pro-
ceedings, have historically been closed and require secrecy to be effec-
tive.18 7 However, grand jury proceedings and search warrant affidavits
are not analogous. It is explicitly stated in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure that grand jury matters are to be secret.188 No
such rule is stated about search warrant affidavits. "[T]he press and pub-
lic have historically had a common law right of access to most pretrial
documents .... ,"9 Rule 6(e) explicitly excludes grand jury documents
from this general presumption of openness. No such exception has ex-
plicitly been made for search warrant affidavits.190
The common-law right of access to search warrant affidavits is not
universally recognized. For example, there are conflicting interpreta-
tions over whether openness exists. "Under English common law, the
public had no right to attend pretrial proceedings."' 91 Today, the public
has a common-law right of access to most pretrial proceedings and docu-
ments, but this does not indicate that the right of access extends to all
183. Id.
184. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Newsday,
895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990).
185. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g); supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
186. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65.
187. See In re Special Grand Jury (for Anchorage, Alaska), 674 F.2d 778, 780-81 (9th
Cir. 1982).
188. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e).
189. Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983). There is a strong presumption in favor of access under the common law. See
United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985); In re National Broadcasting
Co., 653 F.2d 609, 612-13 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d
103, 106 (8th Cir. 1986) (no strong presumption in favor of common-law right of access
to judicial records); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989) (strong
presumption favoring public access to documents does not apply to materials properly
submitted under seal).
190. It has also been noted that there has never been recognized a general right of
access to grand jury documents, while search warrants are generally filed without seal
and therefore are classified as public documents. See In re Newsday, 895 F.2d 74, 78-79
(2d Cir. 1990).
191. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389 (1979).
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pretrial documents.1 92  The court, in Times Mirror Co. v. United
States,193 found that historically no right of access existed because search
warrant affidavits traditionally were closed to the press and public.
1 94
While a common-law right of access to judicial records generally re-
quires a history of access, an important public need may justify access
under the common law.195 Courts have also found a common-law right
of access to particular documents which traditionally have been kept
confidential by the courts where the party seeking access was able to
make a "threshold showing that disclosure will serve the ends of jus-
tice." 196 Several important public benefits justify access, including curb-
ing judicial misconduct and furthering self-government. Open search
warrant affidavits would serve the ends of justice, justifying a common-
law right of access even if a tradition of openness is lacking.
Nonetheless, some courts have argued that under the public need or
ends of justice standard, there is still no right of access to search warrant
affidavits because the ends of justice would be frustrated, not served, if
the public were allowed access to warrant materials. 19 7 These concerns,
however, should not prevent access to all search warrant affidavits; suffi-
cient safeguards exist to protect any interests which would otherwise be
frustrated by open access to affidavits without excessive closure. 1
98
The common-law right of access to public records and documents is
qualified.199 Under the common law, it is within the discretion of the
judicial officer issuing the warrant to grant or deny access. All or some
of the papers may be filed under seal." However, "the public's right to
inspect judicial documents may not be evaded by the wholesale sealing of
court papers. Instead, the district court must be sensitive to the rights of
the public in determining whether any particular document, or class of
documents, is appropriately fied under seal, ' 20 1 and proper procedures
must be followed.2 "2 These measures would be sufficient to protect any
interests while still allowing the press and public access under the com-
mon law.
192. See Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1983).
193. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989).
194. See id. at 1214.
195. See id. at 1219.
196. United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1581 (9th Cir.), modified, 854 F.2d 359
(1988); see also Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219 (common-law access where important
public need justifies access).
197. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219; supra notes 165-178 and accompanying text.
However, either selective sealing or redaction could sufficiently protect any interests
which would be harmed by access without denying access to all search warrant affidavits.
198. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
199. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
200. See In re Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989).
201. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989).
202. See supra note 180.
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CONCLUSION
A right of access to search warrant affidavits is supported by many of
the same policy considerations that the Supreme Court has discussed in
developing the constitutional and common-law rights of access to crimi-
nal trials. The constitutional right of access clearly encompasses more
than a right of access to criminal trials. Courts have found civil trials,
pretrial criminal proceedings and a variety of records and documents in-
volved in the criminal process to be included in this right. Therefore, the
right of access under the first amendment should be recognized to en-
compass a right of access to search warrant affidavits. Similarly, the
common-law right of access includes access to judicial documents as well
as trials. Therefore, the right of access to search warrant affidavits under
the common law should also be recognized.
Erica A. Kaston
